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 What Counts as Prostitution?
STUART P. GREEN* 1
1. Introduction
What counts, or should count, as prostitution? In the criminal law today, prostitution is 
understood to involve the provision of sexual services in exchange for money or other 
benefits. But what exactly is a ‘sexual service’? Is it prostitution to receive a fee in return 
for sexual conduct that does not involve penetration or other touching of the genitals 
(such as lap dancing)? Is it prostitution if there is no physical contact at all between the 
seller and another person (as when the buyer pays to watch the seller strip or mastur-
bate), or if the only physical contact is between the seller and a third party (as when the 
buyer pays others to perform in a sex show or the filming of a pornographic movie)? And 
what exactly is the nature of the required ‘exchange’? Is it prostitution if, in return for sex, 
a person gives money to his spouse or other steady sexual partner? Is it prostitution if sex 
is provided in return for money in the context of a ‘therapeutic’ relationship? Would it 
be prostitution if a person agreed to exchange sex in return for non-propertised benefits 
such as a job promotion or political favour? Would it be prostitution if a person accepted 
money as ‘thanks’ for having sex, or for her incidental ‘expenses’, rather than pursuant to 
a quid pro quo agreement?
Despite the enormous literature that exists on the law and morality of prostitution, 
there has been hardly any attention paid to basic definitional questions of this sort. Even 
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otherwise philosophically sophisticated commentators seem content with a ‘know-it-
when-they-see-it’ approach.1 And the few courts that have considered one or another of 
these definitional questions have proceeded on an ad hoc basis, referring only to local 
law, and without any attempt at systematization.2 
Deciding what should count as prostitution is not likely to be easy. The concept of 
prostitution is deeply embedded within complex cultural, moral, and legal constructs, 
all highly contested. Indeed, there is probably no type of sexual offence the moral and 
legal status of which has generated broader disagreement among scholars and legislatures 
alike. There is controversy even about the term ‘prostitution’ itself.3 
Notwithstanding such obstacles, I believe that the definitional project is one worth 
pursuing. The key is to recognize that how we choose to define prostitution will 
inevitably depend on why we believe one or more aspects of prostitution are wrong or 
harmful, or should be criminalized or otherwise deterred, in the first place. These judge-
ments, in turn, will often depend on an assessment of the contested empirical evidence 
on which they rest.
The analysis that follows consists of four basic steps: I begin with some initial thoughts 
on what ‘prostitution’ means in ordinary language and culture. Second (and this is really 
the heart of the paper), I consider how the ‘what counts as prostitution’ question has aris-
en in a variety of real-world contexts, paying particular attention to two sub-issues: what 
counts as ‘sexual activity’, and what counts as an ‘exchange for property’. Third, I briefly 
describe (without adjudicating among) five leading rationales that have been offered to 
explain why prostitution is wrong or should be deterred or discouraged. I seek to show 
how our answer to these normative questions will ultimately determine our answer to the 
definitional one. Finally, I offer some preliminary thoughts on how analogous questions 
about what should count as sexual conduct arise in the context of consensual offences 
such as adultery and incest, and non-consensual offences such as sexual assault.
2. ‘Prostitution’ in Ordinary Language
Before we consider what ‘prostitution’ means in law, it will be useful to consider what it 
means in ordinary language. In current usage, ‘prostitution’ is understood to refer to the 
1 See, e.g., Ericsson, Charges Against Prostitution: An Attempt at a Philosophical Argument, 90 
Ethics (1980), p. 335, at 348 (‘In this essay, I have deliberately desisted from trying to define 
“prostitution”. I have simply relied upon the fact that we seem to know pretty well what we mean 
by this term.’).  
2 Several of these cases are briefly considered in an annually revised student survey published by 
Georgetown Law School. See Prostitution and Sex Work, 16 Georgetown J. of Gender and the 
Law, eds. Augustson and George (2015), p. 229, at 233-236.
3 See text accompanying note 7 below.
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practice of providing sexual services for payment; and ‘prostitute’ refers to the person 
who offers or agrees to sell such services.4 At its heart, then, prostitution seems to involve 
a commercial transaction.
Historically, however, the term ‘prostitute’ was often used to refer not only to those 
who offered sex for money, but also to those (especially women) who offered sex on an 
‘indiscriminate’ basis, whether or not they were being paid. 5 And it is this sense of in-
discriminate sex that also shades into a highly pejorative, largely metaphorical, and less 
gender-specific sense of the term—namely, that one who ‘prostitutes’ oneself is a ‘sell out’, 
putting her talents and energies to an unworthy or corrupt use for personal gain.6 
In addition to people who ‘prostitute themselves’, we can also talk about people who 
‘are prostituted’. This sense clearly includes sex workers who are coerced into selling sex 
by a sex trafficker or pimp. But it might also refer, again in a metaphorical sense, to per-
sons who are coerced by others, say, to support a cause they find morally abhorrent. 
When A ‘is prostituted,’ the person who has done this to her bears the responsibility for 
whatever harms are done to A or to third parties. By contrast, when A ‘prostitutes herself ’, 
she is ostensibly responsible for what harm she causes (whether to herself or others). 
Many commentators have been concerned about the fact that the terms ‘prostitution’ 
and ‘prostitute’ not only describe, but also often denounce.7 To call someone a ‘prostitute’ 
can be highly derogatory. Even as a purely descriptive term, ‘prostitution’ is problemat-
ic, since it seems to apply exclusively to the practice of selling sex. That is, we would not 
ordinarily say that a person who buys sex was a prostitute, or even that he was engaged 
in prostitution. From a criminal law perspective, prostitution is better understood as a 
transaction that involves both a seller and a buyer.
The most commonly offered alternatives to ‘prostitute’ and ‘prostitution’ are 
‘sex worker’ and ‘sex work’ (or ‘commercial sex’, as the proposed Model Penal Code 
4 ‘Prostitution,’ in Oxford English Dictionary, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/
american_english/prostitution
5 The etymology here is suggestive. The term ‘prostitution’ is derived from the Latin prostituere, 
which means ‘to expose publicly.’ The notion of ‘sex for hire’ is therefore not inherent in the 
etymology, which rather suggests sex that is ‘publicly’ or perhaps ‘indiscriminately’ offered. 
Online Etymology Dictionary, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=prostitute. The idea 
of prostitution involving indiscriminate sex persisted in U.S. law until fairly recently. For example, 
at the time the original Model Penal Code was promulgated, sixteen states defined prostitution 
to include non-commercial promiscuous sex. Model Penal Code §207.12, Commentary at 175, 
note 24 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
6 To prostitute oneself in this figurative sense need not even involve sex: for example, an artist 
can prostitute herself by making bad, but commercially-successful, art. Nor need the reward be 
financial: A politician can prostitute herself by compromising her principles for the purpose of 
winning an election or appointment to high office.
7 See, e.g., Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 Southern California L. Rev. (2000), 
p. 523, at 525.  
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provision would have it).8 For purposes of the present project, however, the terms ‘sex 
work’ and ‘sex worker’ are both too narrow and too broad. They are too narrow because, 
like the term ‘prostitution,’ they apply only to the supply, rather than the demand, side 
of the transaction. And they are too broad because they would seem to apply not only to 
prostitution in the traditional sense of the term, but also to more remote activities such as 
pimping and running a brothel, dancing in a strip club, acting in a pornographic movie, 
working for a telephone sex service, or advertising sexual services. To group all of them 
together would, if nothing else, pose a problem for the principle of fair labeling.9
 Rather than refer to ‘prostitution’ or ‘sex work’, I think we would do better to talk 
about ‘selling sex’ and ‘buying sex’. But even these terms do not offer a perfect solution, 
since they suffer from at least some of the same ambiguity as ‘sex work’ itself. As we 
shall see below, whether the people who work for, or patronise, a strip club or phone sex 
service can be said to be selling or buying sex ultimately depends on what we mean by 
‘sex’ and what we mean by ‘buying’. 
3. Prostitution Defined in Law
Having considered how ‘prostitution’ is used in ordinary language, we now turn to the 
main subject of the inquiry—namely, how it is defined in the law. As we shall see, the 
answer to this question has varied considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
At first glance, such variety is not surprising. There is probably no area of substantive 
criminal law that reflects more variation in how it is formulated. Looking at just the law 
of Western, industrialized nations, and only at statutes involving adults, we can identify 
at least the following five basic models: 
(1) criminalise the buying and selling of sex, as well as related activities such 
as  street walking, kerb crawling, pimping, and brothel-keeping (the policy in 
most U.S. jurisdictions);                                                                                                                                  
(2) criminalise the buying of sex and other related activities by pimps and 
clients, including brothel-keeping, but don’t criminalise the sale of sex or 
related activities by sellers (the policy in Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland, 
Northern Ireland, Canada, and, most recently, France); 
8 Model Penal Code § 213.0(2) (September 15, 2015 draft). 
9 See generally Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 4th ed. 2003), pp. 
89–90; Chalmers and Leverick, Fair Labelling in Criminal Law, 71 Modern L. Rev. (2008), p. 217, 
at 239; Green, Thirteen Ways to Steal a Bicycle: Theft Law in the Information Age (Harvard U. 
Press, 2012), pp. 52-54.
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(3) criminalise prostitution-related activities such as streetwalking, kerb 
crawling, pimping, and brothel-keeping, but don’t criminalise the buying 
or selling of sex as such (the policy in England, Wales, and Scotland)                                             
(4) criminalise pimping and brothel-keeping, but don’t criminalise the pur-
chase or sale of sex as such or other activities by sellers (the policy in Den-
mark and Israel); and                                                                                                                                     
(5) don’t criminalise any prostitution-related activities other than traffick-
ing and forced prostitution, but license, impose age limitations and regulate 
matters of health and safety (the policy in Germany, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, and Nevada).10 
One might imagine that those jurisdictions that shared a particular approach to crim-
inalisation would also share an approach to defining prostitution, and vice versa. But, as 
it turns out, that is not the case at all. In practice, there is little correlation between the 
manner in which prostitution is criminalised and how the act itself is defined. 
So, how has the basic transaction that constitutes the offense of selling or buying 
sex been defined? We can begin by identifying three basic approaches the statutes have 
taken. One group of (mostly older) offense provisions makes it a crime simply to ‘be a 
prostitute,’ ‘engage in an act of prostitution,’ or (in Iceland11) ‘pay for prostitution’—with-
out any additional explanation of what it means to be such a person or engage in such an 
act.12 Defining the offense of prostitution in this way is both circular and vague. It gives 
potential offenders, law enforcement, and courts essentially no instruction about which 
acts are prohibited. Moreover, it is potentially both under- and overinclusive. It is under-
inclusive in the sense that it might be understood to exclude the buying of sex, as well 
as the selling of sexual acts other than intercourse. It is overinclusive in the sense that it 
could conceivably be understood to include prostitution in its non-commercial, merely 
‘promiscuous’, sense. One would think that so vague and circular an offense definition 
would be ripe for constitutional challenge. But, in fact, vagueness and overbreadth chal-
lenges have been almost uniformly unsuccessful in this context.13 
10 This summary is adapted from de Marneffe, Liberalism and Prostitution (Oxford U. Press 2010), 
pp. 28-31.
11 See Iceland Penal Code, Section 206 (2009) (making it a crime to ‘pay . . .  or promise  . . . to pay 
or render consideration of another type, for prostitution’, without any additional explanation of 
what constitutes the act).
12 This is the approach used by statutes in Arizona, California, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, and 
South Carolina. For a useful compendium of U.S. prostitution statutes, though with very little 
analysis, see generally Posner and Silbaugh, A Guide to America’s Sex Laws (U. Chicago Press, 
1996), pp. 155-187.
13 See Baldwin, Split at the Root: Prostitution and Feminist Discourses of Law Reform, 5 Yale J.L. 
& Feminism (2002), p. 47, at 67 & n.60 (citing representative cases).
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A more modern approach to defining prostitution is to specify what it is that must 
be bought or sold. In a majority of U.S. states,14 as well as in England and Wales,15 
Norway,16 and Sweden,17 this is done by referring to the sale or purchase of ‘sexual ac-
tivity’, ‘sexual services’, or ‘sexual contact’, sometimes with further specification of acts, 
but often without. A few other jurisdictions prohibit the sale or purchase of conduct 
that is ‘lewd,’ a notoriously vague term that in this context seems to mean something like 
‘tend[ing] to incite sensual desire or imagination’.18 Defining prostitution as ‘sexual’ or 
‘lewd’ conduct for hire may be a bit better than referring simply to ‘being a prostitute,’ but 
it hardly solves the problem of vagueness. By itself, the term gives us almost no direction 
on how to decide puzzling cases involving conduct such as oral sex, manual-genital stim-
ulation, lap dancing, or stripping. 
The final means of defining prostitution is to enumerate exactly which sexual acts for 
hire are prohibited. While this approach would seem to solve the problem of vagueness 
and overbreadth, it nevertheless raises questions of policy. Which acts should be includ-
ed here?  It is probably no surprise that every U.S. state that follows the enumeration 
approach includes on its list of prohibited acts that of ‘sexual intercourse’.19 But beyond 
that, it is striking how little consensus there is. Other specific acts that are listed in one or 
more, but by no means all, statutes include fellatio, cunnilingus, anal intercourse, manual 
genital touching, sadomasochistic abuse, and flagellation.20 
4. Defining ‘Sexual Activity’
Having surveyed the various ways in which prostitution is statutorily defined, we now 
consider several specific contexts in which questions have arisen, or could arise, about 
14 See statutes in Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, 
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas. See also Model Penal Code § 2017.12(1) 
(referring to ‘sexual activity for hire’). The proposed Draft Model Penal Code Revision of 
September 15, 2015, § 213.0(2) refers to ‘any act of sexual penetration or sexual contact.’ 
15 English Sexual Offences Act 2003, Section 51(2) (requiring that offender offer or provide ‘sexual 
services to another person in return for payment’).
16 Norwegian General Civil Penal Code, Section 316 (making it a crime to engage in ‘sexual activity 
or commit a sexual act with another person for payment’).
17 Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk), Section 6.11 (criminalising ‘purchase of sexual services’). 
18 See, e.g., Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Dizzy Duck, 535 N.W.2d 178, 183 (Mich. 
1995).
19 The Finnish Criminal Code, Chapter 20, Section 8, also makes it a crime to engage, with a victim 
of the sex trade, in ‘sexual intercourse’ (though the precision of this provision is somewhat 
undercut by the addition of the phrase ‘or a comparable sexual act’).
20 See generally statutes listed in Posner and Silbaugh 1996, pp. 155-197. 
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what should count as ‘sexual activity’. I group these into three categories: (a) cases 
involving non-penetrative sexual contact between the seller and buyer; (b) cases involv-
ing no physical contact at all between the seller and buyer or between the seller and any 
third party; and (c) cases involving physical contact, including penetration, between the 
seller and a third party, but no physical contact between the seller and buyer. 
(a) Cases Involving Non-Penetrative Sexual Contact between Buyer and Seller
Should it be prostitution if A engages in, or agrees to engage in, commercial sexual 
activity with B that does not involve penetration (whether vaginal, oral, or anal)? For 
example, is it prostitution to engage in ‘lap dancing’, in which a nude or partially nude 
dancer has bodily contact with a seated patron in a manner that is meant to be sexually 
stimulating? Is it prostitution if A offers to engage in non-penetrative acts of domination 
and submission? Is it prostitution if A offers B a ‘happy ending’ massage (involving man-
ual contact with the genitals)? 
Those courts that have considered issues of this sort have tended to analyze them, 
as no doubt they should, in terms of the language of applicable law. For example, in the 
Hawaii case of Keawe, the defendant agreed to perform a lap dance for money. In de-
termining whether such conduct constituted prostitution, the Hawaiian Supreme Court 
looked to the language of the relevant statute, which defined (1) ‘prostitution’ as ‘sexual 
conduct with another person for a fee’; (2) ‘sexual conduct’ as ‘sexual penetration’ or ‘sex-
ual contact’; and (3) ‘sexual contact’ as ‘any touching . . . of the sexual or other intimate 
parts of a person’.21 On the basis of this language, the court, properly it seems, concluded 
that lap dancing was indeed prostitution.22 The Pennsylvania case of Cohen, involving a 
‘happy ending’ massage, was to the same effect.23 Similarly, in the English case of Tan, the 
defendant was convicted of living off the earnings of prostitutes where customers were 
subjected to humiliation, flagellation, bondage, and torture, sometimes accompanied by 
masturbation, in return for pay.24 
Elsewhere, reliance on statutory language has been less straightforward. For example, 
in the New York case of Georgia, the defendant agreed to perform foot licking, spanking, 
domination, and submission in exchange for a fee.25 The state’s statute required that the 
21 Hawaii Rev. Stat. §712-1200.
22 Hawaii v. Keawe, 108 P.3d 304 (Hawaii 2005). 
23 Commonwealth v. Cohen, 538 A.2d 582 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (interpreting Pennsylvania Cons. 
Stat. Ann. Title 18, § 5902, which makes it a crime to engage in ‘sexual activity as a business’). 
24  R. v. Tan and Others [1983] Q.B. 1053.
25 People v. Georgia, 163 Misc.2d 634 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1994).
72
Stuart P. Green
offender engage in ‘sexual conduct’, but did not define the term any more specifically.26 
With little explanation, the court held that engaging in sadomasochistic conduct for a 
fee did not constitute prostitution under the statute. In dismissing the charges, the court 
viewed it as critical that there was no physical contact between the parties involving a 
‘person’s clothed or unclothed genitals, buttocks or a woman’s breasts’.27
Cases in which the buyer pays to have contact with the seller’s breasts also raise 
issues. Consider, for example, the Minnesota case of Oanes.28 The relevant statute defined 
prostitution as ‘engaging or offering or agreeing to engage for hire in sexual penetration 
or sexual contact,’ and it defined ‘sexual contact’ as including ‘[t]he intentional touching 
by an individual of a prostitute’s intimate parts’.29 (The circularity of requiring that the 
defendant touch the ‘prostitute’s’ intimate parts need hardly be noted.) The question was 
whether a woman’s breasts should be regarded as ‘intimate parts’ within the meaning 
of the statute, and the court held that they should. Its reasoning? The court said simply 
that, ‘[i]n the United States, women normally cover their breasts when in public and take 
offense at a stranger’s touch’.30
(b) Cases Involving no Physical Contact between Seller and Buyer or any Third 
Party
There is also a range of cases in which the buyer pays the seller to engage in sexual 
conduct that involves no physical contact between the seller and anyone else, including 
the buyer. The most common context in which this occurs is where the buyer pays to 
watch the seller strip or engage in self-masturbation. 
I am not aware of any court holding that such conduct constitutes prostitution. 
The Australian case of Begley, involving charges of prostitution brought against a 
stripper, is representative. In dismissing the charge, the court simply asserted, without 
any explanation, that ‘there must be some contact between the person offering the use of 
the body and the person paying the fee’.31
One case that arguably tests the limits of this ‘some contact’ rule is State v. Turn-
paugh. A man (Turnpaugh) offered to pay to watch a woman (Ferguson) masturbate 
26 N.Y. Penal Law § 230.00.
27 Georgia, 163 Misc. 2d at 637. 
28 State v. Oanes, 543 N.W.2d 658 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
29 Minn.Stat. § 609.321, subd. 9 (1994).
30 Oanes, 543 N.W.2d at 661. An analogous issue—whether public exposure of the female breast 
should be regarded as ‘indecent’—is discussed in Green, Reconstructing the Law of Voyeurism 
and Exhibitionism (manuscript).
31 Begley v Police (1995) 78 A Crim R 417, 429 (Lander, J.).
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herself.32 The Wisconsin statute defined prostitution to include not just sexual intercourse 
and oral sex but also ‘[m]asturbat[ing] a person or offer[ing] to masturbate a person or 
request[ing] to be masturbated by a person for anything of value’.33 In the actual case, the 
person prosecuted was Turnpaugh (Ferguson, it turns out, was an undercover cop). Be-
cause none of these acts were be done to Turnpaugh, he escaped liability. But imagine that 
it was Ferguson who had been prosecuted instead. Since she did in fact offer to mastur-
bate ‘a person’—namely, herself—the statute arguably would have been satisfied, and she 
would have been liable. The Wisconsin statute thus presents a curious asymmetry which 
may or may not have been intended by the state legislature.
(c) Cases involving physical contact between seller and a third party
Perhaps the most puzzling cases concerning what should constitute ‘sexual activity’ for 
purposes of prostitution law are those in which the seller has sexual contact with some-
one other than the buyer. There are, essentially, two varieties here: cases in which the 
buyer pays for the seller to engage in sex with a third party for the third party’s gratifica-
tion (essentially, the buyer gives a gift to the third party); and those in which the buyer 
pays the seller to watch the seller engage in sex with a third party for the buyer’s gratifi-
cation.
The first type is illustrated by a rather salacious anecdote from a biography of the 
businessman Richard Branson, which reports that his first sexual experience was with a 
prostitute paid for by his father (apparently, a not uncommon practice among the English 
upper classes at the time).34 One can also imagine a case in which an employer or patron 
buys sexual services as a kind of gratuity for his employee or client, as the case may 
be. For example, in 2012, various gossip websites alleged that New Jersey Senator Bob 
Menendez, while on vacation in the Dominican Republic, received sexual services (from 
underage prostitutes, no less) paid for by a wealthy donor named Salomon Melgen.35 
Is there an argument for exempting from liability the person who has the sex, or 
the person who pays the bill, in such cases? (To be clear, such cases would not qualify 
as ‘pimping’ in most jurisdictions, since the alleged buyer of sex—whether it was the 
32 State v. Turnpaugh, 741 N.W.2d 488 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007).
33 Wis. Rev. Stat. § 944.30(d).
34 Moore, Review of Beyond the Mask by Tom Bower, in The Guardian (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.
theguardian.com/books/2014/feb/12/branson-behind-mask-tom-bower-review
35 Bob Menendez,Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bob_Menendez. Although the 
prostitution charges were never substantiated, Menendez was later indicted for accepting more 
than one million dollars in other gifts and campaign contributions from Melgen.
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elder Branson or Dr. Melgen—was not directly profiting from the agreement.36) A typ-
ical U.S. prostitution statute provides that it is a crime to ‘engage in sexual conduct for 
a fee’.37*Would the statute be satisfied if A had sex with B when B’s fee was paid for by a 
third party, C? There would be no problem in imposing liability on B, since she would 
have provided ‘sex for a fee.’ With respect to A and C, however, the issue is more com-
plicated. A had sex, but arguably not ‘for a fee’; and C paid a fee, but did not have sex. 
So perhaps an argument could be made that such transactions would be exempt from 
prosecution.38 The problem, of course, is that such a loophole would create an incentive 
for parties to engage in ‘straw man’ transactions. Presumably to avoid such confusion, 
a few modern statutes now address the issue explicitly. For example, under the Finnish 
statute, it is a crime to have sex with a victim of the sex trade even when ‘remuneration 
[is] . . . promised or given by a third person.’39 Similarly, Swedish law says that a person 
is guilty of purchasing sexual services even when the ‘payment was promised or given by 
another person’.40
The second sort of case involving sex with a third party is even more puzzling. Con-
sider Taylor v. Arizona.41 The defendants worked at a sex club where they were paid to 
have sex with each other while their customers sat on the other side of a glass pane and 
watched. In upholding the conviction, the court reasoned that while the statute did 
‘require a sexual contact between at least two people,’ it did not necessarily require con-
tact ‘between the prostitute and the customer’.42 
Other jurisdictions have followed a different approach. The California case of Wooten 
v. Superior Court involved essentially the same facts as Taylor.43 This time, though, it was 
the managers of the club who were prosecuted for pimping and pandering, and the court 
held that no crime had been committed. Although the California statute did not specify 
36 For example, under section 52 of the English Sexual Offences Act 2003, it is a crime for an 
offender to cause or incite another person to be a prostitute if he ‘does so for or in the expectation 
of gain for himself or a third person’ (typically by taking a cut of the prostitute’s earnings). This is 
not the scenario I have in mind. In the scenario I have in mind, A causes B to give sexual services 
to C without any expectation of monetary gain: A is just giving a ‘gift’ to C.
37 E.g. Hawaii Rev. Stat. §712-1200.
38 Alternatively, it might be possible to ‘split’ the actus reus between A and C, and charge both 
under a theory of accomplice liability. 
39 Finland Criminal Code, Chapter 20, Section 8.
40 Sweden Criminal Code, Ch. 6, § 11.
41 State v. Taylor, 167 Ariz. 429 (1990).
42 Id. at 430. The Arizona law defined ‘prostitution’ as ‘engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage 
in sexual conduct with another person under a fee arrangement with that person or any other 
person’. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3211(5) (emphasis added).
43 Wooten v. Superior Court, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
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that there had to be physical contact between the sex seller and buyer, the court, relying 
on the principle of lenity, held that this was the better interpretation.44 
The idea that prostitution must involve physical contact between a buyer and seller 
holds important implications for the multi-billion-dollar pornography industry. Much 
pornography depicts sexual acts involving two or more actors who are paid by a producer 
who is not himself engaged in such acts. The question thus arises whether the producer 
of such films could be prosecuted for prostitution or related charges.
In the leading case, People v. Freeman, the California Supreme Court said no.45 Free-
man was a film producer who paid several actors to perform various sexual acts in front 
of a camera. He was prosecuted for ‘pandering’, which under the California Criminal 
Code consists of ‘procur[ing] another person for the purpose of prostitution.’46 In over-
turning his conviction, the court relied on three basic arguments: First, it said, there 
was ‘no evidence that defendant paid the acting fees for the purpose of sexual arousal or 
gratification, his own or the actors.’47 Second, it claimed, ‘[f]or a “lewd” or “dissolute” act 
to constitute “prostitution”, the genitals, buttocks, or female breast, of either the prosti-
tute or the customer must come in contact with some part of the body of the other’, and 
that did not happen here.48 Finally, the court said, even if the defendant’s conduct did fall 
within the literal definition of prostitution, ‘the application of the pandering statute to 
the hiring of actors to perform in the production of a nonobscene motion picture would 
impinge unconstitutionally upon First Amendment values’.49
All three statements are problematic: With respect to the first, it does not require 
much imagination to realise that, even if Freeman was not sexually aroused or gratified 
by the actors’ conduct, the actors themselves probably were. The second statement sug-
gests that liability for prostitution could be avoided whenever the prostitute’s fee was paid 
for by a third party who was not himself engaged in sex, the very same loophole  present-
ed by cases like those involving Branson’s father and Menendez’s patron. Finally, as to 
the free speech argument, it is odd to think that an otherwise illegal act should become 
lawful simply because it was performed in front of a camera. Could one avoid liability for 
44 Cal. Penal Code § 647 defined ‘prostitution’ to include ‘any lewd act between persons for money 
or other consideration’.
45 People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128 (Cal. 1988). 
46 Cal. Penal Code § 266i.
47 Freeman, 758 P.2d at 1130.
48 Id. at 1131.
49 Id. For a similar result, see State v. Washington-Davis, 867 N.W.2d 222 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015). 
The only case I am aware of that reaches a contrary decision is People v. Kovner, 409 N.Y.S.2d 349 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1978).
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prostitution by filming oneself having sex for money? And why would the same reasoning 
not apply to a murder or rape that was captured on film?50 
5. Exchange for Value
In the paradigmatic case of prostitution, the seller of sex offers her services to 
essentially anyone who can pay her fee, in cash. In this section, we consider a variety of 
cases that do not fit this paradigm. We begin by examining (a) the quid pro quo nature of 
‘exchange.’ We then turn to cases in which sex is exchanged for: (b) something other than 
money, such as economically valuable goods or services; (c) non-propertised things of 
value, such as a promotion at work; (d) money or other property within the context of a 
monogamous or relatively exclusive relationship; and (e) money or other property within 
the context of a ‘therapeutic’ relationship.
(a) Quid Pro Quo Requirement
One of the most basic requirements that defines the offense of prostitution is that sex be 
exchanged for money or other property. In practice, this means that receiving or giving 
something of value merely as ‘thanks’ for, or incident to, a sexual act, would not constitute 
prostitution. Rather, the transaction of sex for money must constitute a quid pro quo. 
As such, prostitution is analogous to bribery, which requires that something of value be 
given ‘in exchange for’ an official act.51
A good illustration of what this quid pro quo requirement means in practice can be 
seen in the the Hawaii case of Xiao.52 The defendant, Xiao, met Wagner, an undercover 
cop, at a nightclub in Honolulu. Wagner bought her several drinks, after which she ‘slow 
danced’ with him (i.e., rubbed her body against his body and groin area). Prosecuted for 
50 For further commentary, pro and con, on treating pornography as prostitution, see Colb, The 
Legal Line between Porn and Prostitution, CNN.Com (Aug. 12, 20015), http://edition.cnn.
com/2005/LAW/08/12/colb.pornography/; Kaye, Why Pornography is Not Prostitution: Folk 
Theories of Sexuality in the Law of Vice, 60 St. Louis U. L.J. 243 (2016); Waltman, The Ideological 
Obstacle: Charging Pornographers for Sexual Exploitation (2012), Midwest Political Science 
Association Conference, Chicago IL, April 11-15, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2050290
51 See 18 U.S.C. C. § 201(b). Giving or receiving something of value as ‘thanks’ for an official 
act constitutes the lesser offense of giving or receiving a gratuity, see 18 U.S.C. § 201(c), but 
there is no analogous offence in the context of prostitution. For discussion of the quid pro quo 
requirement in bribery, see Green, What’s Wrong with Bribery, in Duff and Green, Defining 
Crimes: Essays on the Criminal Law’s Special Part (Oxford U. Press, 2005), at pp. 143, 148-151.
52 State v. Jing Hua Xiao, 231 P.3d 968 (Hawaii 2010).
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selling sex, Xiao argued that there was no evidence that the drinks constituted a ‘fee’ and 
that any any sexual conduct that occurred between her and Wagner was ‘merely gratu-
itous’. Perhaps surprisingly, given that the drinks cost forty dollars each, the Hawaii Su-
preme Court agreed with Xiao’s contention. Even though there was nothing, in principle, 
to prevent the purchase of a drink from constituting the payment of a ‘fee’, the court said, 
the prosecution had failed to present sufficient evidence that Xiao had agreed to provide 
sex in return for the drinks.  
 (b) Cases in which Sex is Exchanged for Economic Goods other than Money
While all prostitution statutes require that sex be exchanged for something of value, they 
vary considerably in precisely how the thing of value is defined. Among U.S. statutes, 
prostitution is defined as sex ‘for hire’,53 for a ‘fee’,54 ‘as a business,’55 that is ‘purchased’,56 or 
that is exchanged for ‘money’,57 ‘money or its equivalent’,58* ‘money or other property’,59 
‘money, property, or services’,60 or ‘anything of value’.61 Meanwhile, Icelandic law makes it 
a crime to pay or render ‘consideration’ in return for sex,62 while English and Norwegian 
law speak in terms of making or promising ‘payment’.63 
Where the exchange is defined in broad terms, prostitution will be found to have been 
committed even in cases that do not reflect the traditional sex-for-cash paradigm. For ex-
ample, under Indiana law, ‘prostitution’ is defined as ‘sexual intercourse or deviate sexual 
conduct in return for money or other property,’ and ‘property’ is defined to include ‘real 
property, personal property, money, labor, and services.’64 With such a broad definition, 
it is no surprise that in the case of Edwards, the defendant was held liable for agreeing 
to provide sexual services in return for a ‘ride across town’ in her prospective custom-
er’s car.65 Similarly, under English law, which defines the term ‘payment’ to include ‘any 
53 Florida Stat. Ann. 796.07.
54 Alaska Stat. 11.66.100; Arkansas Code 5-70-102.
55 Pennsylvania Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5902. 
56 Iowa Code Ann. 725.1
57 Georgia Code Ann. 16-6-9.
58 Virginia Code Ann. § 18.2-346.
59 Indiana Code Ann. 35-45-4-2.
60 Draft Model Penal Code Revision of September 15, 2015, § 213.0(2).
61 Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-7-201; Illinois Stat. ch.720, para. 5/11-14.
62 Iceland Penal Code Section 206.
63 Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 51(2); Norwegian Penal Code Section 316.
64 Indiana Code Section 35–41–1–23.
65 Edwards v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1249 (Indiana Ct. App. 2004),
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financial advantage, including the discharge of an obligation to pay’,66 one would expect a 
court to find prostitution in a case in which a ‘single mother . . . [has] sex with her land-
lord in place of rent’.67
By contrast, where the statutory language is narrow, a different result is to be 
expected. For example, in the Illinois case of Johnson, the defendant contended that the 
prostitution statute was unconstitutionally vague because it would ‘make a “prostitute” of 
a woman who offers, performs or agrees to perform sexual acts in overt or tacit exchange 
for an expensive dinner or a concert, an exchange the defendant contends is part of an 
unwritten social code’.68 In rejecting this vagueness argument, the court stated that the 
‘committee which drafted the statute specifically limited its language to apply only to sex 
acts performed for “money,” instead of for “any valuable consideration.”’ Thus, ‘an offer or 
agreement to receive money, rather than, for example, a fur coat or a night at the opera 
. . . is essential to a prostitution conviction’. To construe the statute otherwise, the court 
said, would have the untoward effect of interfering with what it called ‘ordinary social 
situations’, and ‘discourag[ing] exchanges of sexual acts as a part of social companionship 
or for gifts of material goods’.69 Presumably, this strict sex-for-cash approach would also 
have the even more perverse effect of excluding a wide range of transactions in which 
sex is exchanged for drugs, cases that pose some of the most serious public health risks 
associated with commercialised sex.70
(c) Sex in Return for Non-Propertised Goods 
All of the cases we have considered so far have involved the exchange of sex for prop-
erty of some sort—whether money, services, or goods. We now turn to cases involving 
the exchange of sex for things not easily propertised, such as political favours or job 
promotions. While there is essentially no case law directly considering whether conduct 
of this sort should count as prostitution, the question is nevertheless worth posing. 
66 Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 51(2).
67 See Miller, Sugar Dating: A New Take on an Old Issue, 20 Buffalo J. Gender, Law & Social Policy 
(2010), pp. 33, 40.
68 People v. Johnson, 376 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ill. Ct. Ap. 1978) (interpreting Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 38, 
sec. 11-15).
69 Id. (citations omitted). The Illinois statute was subsequently broadened to refer to sex exchanged 
for ‘anything of value’. 
70 See Miller, Prostitution, in The Oxford Handbook of Crime and Public Policy, ed. Tonry (Oxford 
U. Press, 2011), pp. 547-577.
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Consider, for a start, the facts of Tunnel, a case from the U.S. Fifth Circuit.71 Tunnel 
owned the Pines Motel in Kilgore, Texas, which he effectively ran as a brothel. Russell 
was the local justice of the peace. Tunnel offered Russell sexual services in return for 
Russell’s ‘looking the other way’ while criminal acts were being performed ‘on his watch’. 
In the actual case, Tunnel was convicted of offering Russell a bribe. In rejecting Tunnel’s 
argument that bribery under Texas law required ‘pecuniary gain,’ the court said it was 
sufficient that Russell had received the ‘benefit’ of sexual favours.72 
 Now imagine that, rather than being prosecuted for receiving or giving a bribe, 
Russell or Tunnel were prosecuted for prostitution. Although there do not appear to 
be any such cases on the books, it is worth asking whether sex given in exchange for a 
non-propertised ‘benefit’ of this sort should fall within the realm of prostitution law. In 
terms of most of the rationales for criminalising prostitution that we’ll discuss below— 
protecting religious values, preventing commodification of sex and the objectification 
of women, protecting the health of sex workers and the public, and preventing violence 
against and exploitation of women—it is hard to see why the result should be any differ-
ent from a conventional case involving sex for money. 
(d) Exchanges Involving Sex with Spouses and Other ‘Exclusive’ Sexual Partners
In the Tunnel case, Russell was just one of many ‘customers’ receiving sex from the wom-
en who worked at the Pines Motel. Would it have made any difference if the relationship 
between the ‘buyer’ and ‘seller’ had been more exclusive? In this section, we consider ca- 
ses in which sex is exchanged for money or other property within spousal relationships, 
between so-called ‘sugar daddies’ and ‘sugar babies,’ and in so-called ‘office romances’. 
Let us look first at spouses. As Martha Nussbaum and others have recognised, mar-
riage and sex have always had an economic element:
[M]ost cultures contain a continuum of relations between women and men (or 
between same-sex pairs) that have a commercial aspect—ranging from the admit-
ted case of prostitution to cases of marriage for money, going on an expensive date 
where it is evident that sexual favors are expected at the other end, and so forth. In 
most cultures, marriage itself has a prominent commercial aspect: the prominence 
of dowry murder in contemporary Indian culture, for example, testifies to the degree 
to which a woman is valued, above all, for the financial benefits one can extract from 
her family.73
71 See, e.g, United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1982).
72 Id. at 1186.
73 Nussbaum, ‘Whether from Reason or Prejudice’: Taking Money for Bodily Services, 27 Legal 
Studies (1998), pp. 693, 700.
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Indeed, Igor Primoratz has gone so far as to assert that ‘there is no morally significant 
difference between the common prostitute and the spouse in what used to be called a 
marriage of convenience’.74 This kind of marriage, Primoratz quotes Engels as saying, 
‘turns often enough into the crassest prostitution—sometimes of both partners, but far 
more commonly of the woman, who only differs from the ordinary courtesan in that she 
does not let out her body on piecework as a wage worker, but sells it once and for all into 
slavery’.75
Whatever one thinks of Engels’ characterization of marriage as ‘slavery,’ the fact 
remains that, even in our contemporary world, the line between sex ‘for love’ (or pleasure, 
procreation, or spousal duty) and sex ‘for money’ is not always a bright one. As Roy  Bau-
meister and Kathleen Vohs have argued, female sexuality can be understood as a valuable 
resource. Because male sexuality is said to be less valuable in comparison, heterosexual 
intercourse is not an equal exchange. ‘To make the exchange equal,’ they say, ‘the man 
must give [the woman] something else in return.’76 And the thing given sometimes takes 
the form of valuable property.77 Indeed, a large empirical study of American couples by 
Philip Blumstein and Pepper Schwartz found that ‘financial considerations influenced 
sexual behavior. In particular, women who lacked their own independent means of fi-
nancial support . . . felt less able or less willing to refuse their husbands’ sexual advances, 
as compared to other women’.78 
74 Primoratz, What’s Wrong with Prostitution?, 68 Philosophy (1993), pp. 159, 160. 
75 Id. (quoting Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (trans. A. West) 
(Penguin, 1985), p. 102).
76 Baumeister and Vohs, Sexual Economics: Sex as a Female Resource for Social Exchange in 
Heterosexual Transactions, 8 Personality and Social Psychology Review (2004), p. 339.
77 In Mozambique, according to one source, husbands are expected to give their wives gifts of 
money in return for sex. Arnfred, Sexuality & Gender Politics in Mozambique: Rethinking Gender 
in Africa (James Currey Publishers, 2011), p. 194.
78 Baumeister and Vohs 2004, p. 348 (citing Blumstein, American Couples: Money, Work, Sex 
(William Morrow, 1983)). Though it should be noted that the sex-as-economic-transaction 
theory probably has less salience in the context of marriage than elsewhere because, as Baumeister 
and Vohs put it, ‘commitment has already been made, because material property is jointly owned 
and therefore not available for exchange, and because the marital contract regarding sex removes 
the couple from the competitive marketplace’. Id at 359.
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Presumably anticipating such cases, several American jurisdictions have expressly 
defined prostitution to exclude ‘marital intercourse’79 or sexual acts with one’s ‘spouse’.80 
But the question remains whether it makes sense to do so. 
Until approximately thirty years ago, rape within marriage was widely exempt from 
prosecution as well. Defenders of such laws argued, among other things, that they were 
necessary to prevent governmental intrusion into matters of marital privacy.81 Such  ar-
guments have mostly been rejected, and the marital rape exemption has largely been 
repealed. Should that development have any bearing on what we might call the ‘mar-
ital prostitution exemption’? As we’ll see below, it depends on what the purpose of 
prostitution law is in the first place. Assuming, for the moment, that it is mainly meant 
to protect women from being coerced or exploited into having sex they do not wish to 
have, and given that such coercion and exploitation can undoubtedly occur within the 
marital relationship, there is at least a prima facie argument for doing away with such an 
exemption, at least on the ‘buyer’s’ side. 
Even if the marital prostitution exemption were to be maintained, however, we would 
still need to contend with cases involving non-marital monogamous or semi-monog-
amous relationships. Consider, first, cases in which so-called ‘sugar babies’ agree with 
their ‘sugar daddies’ to exchange companionship and sexual favours for college tuition, 
living expenses, clothing, jewelry, or other valuable property.82 Should such exchanges be 
regarded as prostitution?
I would argue that what distinguishes relationships like these from those in more 
conventional cases of prostitution is that they are essentially ‘exclusive’ in character. 
Prostitution has often been described, in both statutory and case law, as involving not 
just sex for money, but sex for money that is ‘indiscriminate’, ‘promiscuous’, or (in the 
79 E.g. Wisconsin Rev. Stat. § 944.30(1m)(a). 
80 E.g. Colorado Rev. Stat. § 18-7-201(1). Hawaii Rev. Stat. §712-1200 (defining ‘sexual contact’ as 
‘any touching . . . of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person not married to the actor’).
81 See, e.g, People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1984) (considering and rejecting 
this argument).
82 See generally Motyl, Note, Trading Sex for College Tuition: How Sugar Daddy ‘Dating’ Sites May 
be Sugar Coating Prostitution, 117 Penn State L. Rev. (2013), pp. 927, 929; see also Miller 2010. 
To cite one particularly notable case, Donald Sterling, the 80-something former owner of the 
Los Angeles Clippers basketball team, reportedly gave his 30-something mistress, V. Stiviano, 
more than $3.6 million in gifts, including a duplex apartment, a Ferrari, two Bentleys, a Range 
Rover, jewelry, luggage, and designer clothes. See Lindsey Bever, Donald Sterling’s Estranged 
Wife Wins Back Millions He Lavished on V. Stiviano, Washington Post (April 15, 2015), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/04/15/donald-sterlings-estranged-
wife-wins-back-millions-he-lavished-on-mistress/
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words of Swedish law) ‘casual’.83 Unlike the conventional prostitute, who may have sex 
with numerous partners in a day, the paid ‘mistress’ typically has just one ‘client’ over an 
extended period of time, from whom she may derive not just money but also affection, 
prestige, and mentoring.84  
A similar dynamic may exist in the case of so-called ‘office romances’ in which a junior 
corporate executive agrees to have sex with a powerful senior executive, on an ongoing 
basis, in return for a promotion or raise (an apparently not uncommon practice85). While 
some cases of this type could be handled (civilly) as sexual harassment, or (criminally) 
as an abuse of position, many could not. For example, imagine that the junior party has 
entered into the relationship without being pressured to do so, perhaps even on her own 
initiative. Does it make any sense to think of such cases as prostitution?
The ‘office romance’ cases differ from the paradigmatic case of prostitution, it seems 
to me, in two key ways: First, as in the marriage and sugar daddy cases, the relationships 
involved are more or less ‘exclusive.’ Second, as in the Tunnel case (involving the Texas 
justice of the peace), sex is exchanged for a non-propertised benefit. We would have to 
have a quite broad rationale for criminalising prostitution to justify including such cases 
within the meaning of the offence. 
(e) Therapeutic Sex
Finally, we consider a class of cases that, though they do involve both ‘sex for money’ and 
non-‘exclusive’ relationships, nevertheless test the limits of what constitutes prostitution. 
83 See Sweden Penal Code Section 6.11; Louisiana Rev. Stat. Title 14, § 82 (prostitution is 
‘indiscriminate sexual intercourse with others for compensation’); Vermont Stat. Ann. Title 13, 
§2631 (prostitution includes offering or receiving the body for indiscriminate sexual intercourse 
without hire); Oklahoma Stat. Ann. Title 21, § 1030 (prostitution is lewdness in exchange for 
money; lewdness is defined as ‘the giving or receiving of the body for indiscriminate sexual’ 
activity with person not one’s spouse). See also People v. Head, 304 P.2d 761 (Cal. App Ct. 1956) 
(‘Prostitution is the common, indiscriminate, illicit intercourse of a woman for hire.’); Colletti 
v. Morehead, 50 N.Y.S 2d 78, 81 (1944); Trent v. Commonwealth, 25 S.E.2d 350 (Va. 1943) 
(‘prostitution’ means common, indiscriminate, illicit intercourse for hire).
84 There is also a considerable gray area in between. So, for example, X may build a small, exclusive 
client list of people with whom she has sex in return for expensive gifts, while Y may be willing 
to have sex with any man who buys her dinner. (Thanks to Jeremy Horder for pressing me on 
this point.)
85 According to a recent study from the Center for Work-Life Policy, more than half of American 
corporate executives surveyed (both men and women) believe that ‘when a junior woman is 
having a sexual dalliance with the boss . . . salary hikes and plum assignments are being traded 
for sexual favors’. Hewlett, How Sex Hurts the Workplace, Especially Women, Harvard Business 
Review blog (Aug. 24, 2010), https://hbr.org/2010/08/how-sex-hurts-the-workplace-es. 
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I have in mind the kind of ‘therapeutic sex’ depicted in the 2012 film The Sessions, based 
on a true story, in which a man suffering from polio and forced to live in an iron lung has 
a series of encounters with a professional sex surrogate.86 Given its sexual, ‘promiscuous,’ 
and commercial character, is there anything to exempt such conduct from being prose-
cuted as prostitution? 
So far as I can tell, there are no reported criminal cases in which the question has 
been considered. But the issue has arisen as a matter of professional ethics. In France, 
neither buying nor selling sex was a crime until this year (when the law was changed to 
criminalise the former). Yet, in 2013, the French National Ethics Committee opined that 
sexual surrogacy constitutes an ‘unethical use of the human body for commercial pur-
poses’.87 
Although not without controversy, such therapy (originally described by Masters 
and Johnson in their 1970 textbook, Human Sexual Inadequacy) is viewed by some in 
the medical profession as an effective and appropriate therapy for people with extreme 
anxiety about sex and, increasingly, to fulfill the needs or desires of people with seri-
ous disabilities.88 Sherry Colb has suggested that we think of the relationship between 
ordinary prostitution and sexual surrogacy as analogous to that between recreational 
and medical marijuana use.89 Under this approach, even if sexual surrogacy did consti-
tute a prima facie case of prostitution, it might make sense to allow its practitioners a 
justification-type defense to any criminal charges. On the other hand, as Colb recognises, 
while people use medical marijuana to ease ‘what would otherwise be nearly intolerably 
painful health problems’, it is not clear that the problems faced by those who use sexual 
surrogates really compare. 
As we shall see in a moment, one of the most compelling arguments for continuing 
to criminalise at least some buying of sex is to prevent the exploitation and coercion—
of sellers—that often occurs. In the case of sexual surrogacy, the potential for exploita-
tion of the seller seems minimal. If anyone is likely to be the victim of exploitation, it is 
probably the buyer.90 The professional norms that ordinarily govern relations between 
86 The Sessions (Fox Searchlight, 2012).
87 Hamblin, Intimacy in an Iron Lung, The Atlantic (July 9, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/
health/archive/2013/07/intimacy-in-an-iron-lung/277606/; see also de la Baume, Disabled 
People Say They, Too, Want a Sex Life, and Seek Help in Attaining It, New York Times (July 4, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/05/world/europe/disabled-people-say-they-too-want-
a-sex-life-and-seek-help-in-attaining-it.html
88 Rosenbaum et al., Surrogate Partner Therapy: Ethical Considerations in Sexual Medicine, 11 
Journal of Sex Medicine (2014), p. 321.
89 Colb, Sexual Surrogacy: Better Than Prostitution?, Justia.com (July 24, 2013), https://verdict.justia.
com/2013/07/24/sexual-surrogacy-better-than-prostitution. Though it is worth considering the 
possibility that even ‘recreational’ marijuana and prostitution could have therapeutic benefits.
90 Colb makes a similar point. 
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therapists and patients, and which strictly prohibit sexual relations, are severely tested 
by such surrogacy.91 There may well be good reasons for prohibiting sexual surrogacy, 
whether criminally or as a matter of professional ethics, but it is doubtful that prostitu-
tion law offers a particularly appropriate method for doing so. 
6. Rationales for Prohibiting Prostitution
So far, we have considered how various jurisdictions have determined what counts as 
prostitution as a matter of positive law. In this section, we finally turn to the normative 
question—namely, what should count as prostitution? As we shall see, there is no one-
size-fits-all answer. The only way to determine what should count as prostitution is by 
considering why buying or selling sex are considered wrong, or appropriate for reduction 
or deterrence, in the first place; and those, of course, are highly contested questions. To 
illustrate, I intend to consider five commonly-offered rationales for criminalising, or at 
least regulating, the sale or purchase of sex. These are: (1) protecting religious values and 
family integrity; (2) protecting the health of sex workers and the public; (3) preventing 
violence against sex workers; (4) preventing objectification of women and commodifica-
tion of sex; and (5) preventing economic exploitation and oppression of sex workers and 
of women generally. I hope to show how the choice of rationale will ultimately determine 
how we answer the ‘what counts as prostitution’ question. 
(a) Methodology
Before we can begin, I need to explain a number of ways in which the discussion will be 
limited:
First, my goal is to articulate the basic gist of a representative range of some of the most 
influential arguments for prohibiting or regulating prostitution or for believing that it is 
wrong. I present the arguments in broad strokes, offering little of the detail and nuance 
that can be found in the voluminous scholarly literature. In some cases, I have sought 
to simplify matters by grouping what I perceive as related arguments under a common 
heading (e.g., objectification and commodification). In other cases, I have sought to  dis-
tinguish between arguments that other scholars may conflate. Even if readers disagree 
with how I have articulated, or grouped, one or more of these rationales, I hope they 
will nevertheless be persuaded that, in deciding the definitional issue, the rationales we 
choose are decisive.
91 Id. 
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Second, I make no sharp distinction between arguments for why prostitution is wrong 
and arguments for why it should be criminalised, reduced, or regulated. Although the is-
sues are conceptually distinct (one could certainly believe that buying or selling sex were 
wrong without believing that they should be criminalised or regulated, and vice versa), 
what matters for present purposes is that both kinds of arguments are relevant to the 
‘what should count as prostitution’ question. For similar reasons, I shall not attempt to 
distinguish between arguments for why prostitution is inherently wrong and arguments 
for why it is contingently so. Nor shall I distinguish between arguments for why it should 
be criminalised and arguments for why it should merely be regulated. 
Third, I make no clear distinction between the act of buying sex and that of selling it. 
Even if only one side of the transaction (most likely, the purchase) were to be criminalised 
or prohibited, we would still need to know what counts as prostitution. Similarly, I make 
no sharp distinction between the core acts of buying and selling sex, on the one hand, 
and related acts such as pimping, brothel-keeping, street walking, and kerb crawling, on 
the other. The concepts of buying and selling sex are logically prior to those of pimping, 
brothel-keeping, and the like. Thus, even if a given jurisdiction were to criminalise only 
the latter sort of act, it would still need to formulate a conception as to what constituted 
the former.
Fourth, the rationales I consider are not meant to be mutually exclusive. As the rhet-
oric surrounding current Nordic prostitution regimes suggests, most of the rationales 
are complementary and cumulative.92 Thus, even if a given rationale was not sufficient 
by itself to justify criminalisation, combined with one or more other rationales, it might 
well be. 
Fifth, and crucially, I take these rationales more or less as I find them, making no 
attempt to assess the normative or empirical claims on which they rest. For example, I 
do not consider how frequently sex workers are in fact subject to coercion, exploitation, 
harassment, infection, mental health problems, or violence. I do not consider how the 
experience of sex workers is likely to differ depending on the circumstances in which 
they practice—for example, whether they are engaged in ‘indoor’ vs. ‘outdoor’ prostitu-
tion, are high-paid ‘call girls’ or low wage ‘street walkers’, brothel employees, or ‘window 
workers’. Nor do I consider the differences between female and male sellers (or buyers) of 
sex. Instead, I simply ask what the implications would be with respect to the definitional 
question, taking these various rationales, and the empirical claims on which they are 
based, at face value. 
92 See Skilbrei and Holmström, Is There a Nordic Prostitution Regime?, 40 Crime and Justice 
(2011), p. 479; Fleharty, Comment, Targeting the ‘Tricks’ of the Trade: A Comparative Analysis 
of Prostitution Laws in Sweden and the United States, 15 Oregon J. International Law (2013), pp. 
443, at 448-450.
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Sixth, just as I do not assess the evidence regarding the conditions under which pros-
titutes actually work, I also refrain from assessing the extent to which a given approach 
to criminalisation would be likely to achieve its stated goals. Thus, I do not consider the 
possibility that some forms of criminalisation, rather than reducing the risks of stigma-
tization, violence, or disease to which sellers of sex are subject, might actually increase 
them. I do not consider the possibility that criminalisation might infringe on any indi-
vidual’s rights to sexual autonomy, or that allowing people to sell sexual services, might, 
under the right circumstances, be ‘empowering’. Nor I do consider the ‘fit’ between crim-
inalisation and the problems it is supposed to address. For example, I do not consider the 
possibility that some of the arguments for why prostitution should be criminalised are 
under- or overinclusive.
Finally, in articulating the various arguments that have been offered to explain why 
prostitution is wrong or should be deterred or discouraged, I will not attempt to say 
whether a given rationale meets the requirements of liberal criminalisation theory more 
generally. For example, I will not consider the possibility that, even if sellers of sex cause 
serious harms to themselves, such harms might fail to provide an appropriate basis for 
criminalisation in a liberal society. More generally, I shall resist categorizing various jus-
tifications for criminalising prostitution as involving ‘harms to others’, ‘harms to self ’, ‘of-
fense to others’, or ‘legal moralism’, or excluding them from consideration simply because 
they are inconsistent with a liberal approach to criminalisation. 
(b) Five Rationales for Why Prostitution is Wrong or should be Criminalised
● Protecting Religious Values
From a traditional, Western, Judeo-Christian perspective, there are essentially two re-
lated and overlapping justifications for prohibiting prostitution. One is premised on the 
view that the only kind of sex that is morally permissible is that which occurs within a 
heterosexual, monogamous, marital relationship, and which has procreation as its main 
purpose. Sex that does not meet this paradigm is regarded as immoral. Under this view, 
prostitution would be regarded as immoral for the same reasons fornication and adultery 
would be regarded as immoral.93 The second justification views the ban on prostitution as 
93 See, e.g., Wurmbrand, Prostitution, in Encyclopedia Judaica (Macmillan, 2d ed. 2006), vol. 
16, pp. 625, 626 (‘every sexual act between a man and a woman outside marital relations was 
considered as coming within the definition of prostitution (be’ilat zenut), and the rabbis strongly 
condemned manifestations of sexual license in the Jewish community’). For a similar, Christian-
based, rationale, see Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford U. Press, 1965), pp. 12, 179 
(written in response to the 1957 Wolfenden Committee Report on Homosexual Offences and 
Prostitution).
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a means to preserve the integrity of the family, prevent divorce, and assure that children 
are conceived within a (heterosexual) marital home.94 
Taking the religious position at face value, what would we expect its implications to 
be with respect to the ‘what counts as prostitution’ question? As far as I am aware, there 
is no discussion of the issue within the religious literature itself. We can, however, make 
some educated guesses. 
To the extent that society is interested in channeling sexual desire into procreative 
activities, preventing the ‘wasting’ of sperm, and preserving family harmony, we would 
expect a fairly broad definition of prostitution. Under this approach, oral and anal sex, 
happy ending massage, and even lap dancing would all arguably fall within the scope of 
what counts as prostitution. On the other hand, if the main reason for prohibiting prosti-
tution was to prevent out-of-wedlock births, we would expect a rather narrow definition 
of the offense, limited essentially to vaginal intercourse.
Under either religious rationale, the ‘commercial’ aspect of prostitution would be of 
relatively little importance. What makes prostitution wrong, according to the religious 
approach, is not so much that sex is being paid for, but that it is almost invariably extra-
marital and promiscuous.95 We would therefore expect the moralist to embrace the mar-
ital prostitution exemption. So long as the sex was obtained within the confines of mar-
riage (and involved vaginal intercourse), there would be no reason to prohibit it simply 
because it was bought. On the other hand, ‘sugar daddy’, ‘office romance’, and professional 
surrogate sex would all presumably remain illicit, since all involve sex that occurs outside 
the realm of marriage. 
● Protecting the Health of Sex Workers and the Public
Historically, one of the most important rationales for criminalising prostitution has been 
protecting the public health and preventing the spread of disease. Indeed, it was such 
94 As the U.S. Supreme Court characterized commercial sex workers in 1908, ‘[t]he lives and 
examples of such persons are in hostility to “the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing 
from the union for life of one man and one woman in the holy estate of matrimony; the sure 
foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civilization, the best guaranty of that reverent 
morality which is the source of all benevolent progress in social and political improvement”’. 
United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 401 (1908) (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 
(1885)).
95 As Aquinas put it, ‘paying a prostitute for fornication involves money given for something 
unlawful, but the giving itself is not unlawful’. Thus, the prostitute ‘may keep her fee’ and is not 
obliged to give it back to the customer’ (unless, that is, she demands too much for her services). 
See Dever, Aquinas on the Practice of Prostitution, in Essays in Medieval Studies: Proceedings of 
the Illinois Medieval Association  (vol. 13, 1996), available at http://www.illinoismedieval.org/
ems/VOL13/dever.html (quoting Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 2-2.32.7).
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concerns that gave rise to the first wave of modern prostitution statutes, the English 
Contagious Diseases Acts of the 1860s, which allowed police officers to arrest prostitutes 
in certain ports and garrison towns, and subject them to compulsory checks for venereal 
disease.96 Protection of public health was also a leading rationale of American prosti-
tution laws in the Progressive Era of the early 20th century.97 The argument here is not 
that buying or selling sex should be prohibited because they are intrinsically wrong, but 
rather, because of the way they are practiced in the real world.
Although 19th and early 20th century reformers seem to have been concerned pri-
marily with the health of sex buyers, today it is recognized that the most significant 
health risks are to sex sellers, especially those who work the streets.98 In addition to HIV 
and other venereal infections, sex workers often suffer from gynecological, palatal, and 
mental health problems, including post-traumatic stress, depression, anxiety, and disso-
ciative orders.99 As a result, even those jurisdictions that have decriminalised both the 
buying and selling of sex, such as the Netherlands and Nevada, continue to regulate it.
For purposes of this discussion, let us take at face value the idea that preventing the 
spread of disease offers a rationale for prohibiting or regulating the buying and selling of 
sex.100 What would be the implications of such a view with respect to the ‘what counts as 
prostitution’ question?
My best guess is that we would end up with a relatively narrow definition of both 
the ‘sexual conduct’ and ‘exchange’ elements. Even if the public health rationale did jus-
tify prohibiting or regulating (the purchase, if not the sale of) penetrative sex for hire, 
it would provide relatively little justification for prohibiting or regulating non-penetra-
tive sex, involving, say, lap dancing, sadomasochistic conduct, breast touching, or genital 
stimulation. On the other hand, there would be no basis not to include penetrative sex in 
which the seller’s fee was paid by a third party. Slightly less clear would be cases in which 
the buyer pays to watch two or more other people having sex (as in Taylor, Wooten, and 
Freeman). Assuming that the sex was penetrative, serious health concerns would still 
96 I review this history in Green, Vice Crimes and Preventive Justice, 8 Criminal Law and Philosophy 
(2013), p. 561.  
97 See id. 
98 For a useful summary of the evidence, see Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 
Southern California L. Rev (2000), pp. 523, at 545-552.
99 See Dempsey, Sex Trafficking and Criminalization: In Defense of Feminist Abolitionism, 158 U. 
Pennsylvania L. Rev. (2010), pp. 1729, at 138-139. 
100 Though it should be noted that there is reason to believe that, among some populations, casual, 
non-commercial sex is at least as common a transmitter of disease as prostitution. See Kelland, 
Disease Risk Higher for Swingers than Prostitutes, Reuters.com (June 23, 2010), http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-sex-diseases-swingers-idUSTRE65M6NX20100623 (reporting on Dutch 
study). Assuming that’s true, it would suggest that legislation prohibiting commercial sex is 
woefully underinclusive.
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be present for the performers themselves (though the risk to the broader ‘public’ would 
presumably be less). 
And how would the disease-prevention rationale play out with respect to defining 
the proper limits of ‘exchange’? It certainly should not matter that sex was exchanged for 
something other than money, such as the monthly rent or a ride across town. The cases 
where the disease-prevention rationale would lead to a significantly different outcome 
are those involving essentially ‘exclusive’ relationships, whether marital, sugar-baby, or 
office romance. In the case of marital prostitution, the risk of disease would be no greater 
than in the case of ordinary marital sex. And in the case of office romance and sugar baby 
relationships, the risk of spreading disease would be no greater than in other cases of 
(non-commercial) adultery or fornication. 
● Preventing Violence against Sex Workers 
In addition to the risk of infection, commercial sex workers also face the danger of 
violence and physical abuse. Women who sell sex are far more likely than the general 
population to be raped, beaten, and even killed.101 According to one controversial Cana-
dian study, the mortality rate among prostitutes was found to be forty times the national 
average.102 
There is a debate about whether criminalising prostitution alleviates such risks, or 
actually exacerbates them, since women who are engaged in illegal (as opposed to legal)
prostitution are probably more likely to be abused in the first place, and less likely to 
report such violence to the police or to be taken seriously when they do.103 For present 
purposes, we need not resolve the issue. Rather, I want to ask the same question I have 
been asking all along: if we take this rationale at face value, what would the implications 
be with respect to what should count as prostitution? 
The answer is likely to turn almost entirely on empirical findings. There are data 
indicating that the incidence of violence against prostitutes who work ‘outside’ is consid-
erably greater than that committed against those who work ‘inside’.104 This would suggest, 
at a minimum, that sugar baby, office romance, and marital cases should be excluded 
from the definition of prostitution. I am not aware of any data, however, correlating the 
incidence of violence with the sale of specific types of sexual activity. If it turned out that, 
101 Law 2000, p. 533.
102 Id.
103 See, e.g., Cunningham and Shah, Decriminalizing Prostitution: Surprising Implications for 
Sexual Violence and Public Health, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 
20821 (2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20281
104 See Weitzer, Sex Work, Gender, and Criminal Justice, in The Oxford Handbook of Gender, Sex, 
and Crime, eds. Gartner and McCarthy (Oxford U. Press, 2014), pp. 508, at 514.
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other things being equal, the risk of violence from commercial non-penetrative sex was 
less than that from commercial penetrative sex, we should be less likely to want to define 
the former as prostitution. 
● Preventing the Commodification of Sex and the Objectification of Women
Two additional, closely related grounds for condemning prostitution are that it involves 
(1) the ‘commodification’ of sex, and (2) the ‘objectification’ of women. Both arguments 
seem to go to the inherent structure of prostitution, rather than to the social environment 
in which it is actually practiced.
The argument regarding objectification is that buying sex ‘objectifies the seller, 
insofar as it entails interacting with and caring about parts of the seller that are bodily 
and incidental; sometimes it involves a desire that the prostitute be either passive or easily 
controlled, suggesting a further sense in which a person is treated as not fully human, or 
as an object’.105 According to the advocates of this approach, treating women this way fails 
to recognize them as free and equal persons, dehumanizes them, and encourages their 
victimisation.
The argument from commodification follows a similar tack. It says that, because per-
sons’ bodies and sexual capacities play an integral role in defining their identity, one who 
works as prostitute sells her personhood and therefore herself.106 According to this view, 
prostitution is a transaction in which one person must be defined as a social subordinate 
who caters to the desires of another.107 
The commodification argument, as I understand it, is dependent on a particular 
view of what constitutes ‘good’ or ‘moral’ sexual conduct. As Elizabeth Anderson has 
explained, the good of sex is: 
105 Marino, Prostitution, in, The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. LaFollette (Wiley-Blackwell, 
(2013). For a critique and elaboration of the objectification view, see Nussbaum, Sex and Social 
Justice (Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 214-218. Kant’s critique of prostitution can also be 
understood as resting on a theory of objectification. See Kant, Lectures on Ethics (Louis Infield, 
trans.) (Hackett, 1930), p. 165 (‘Human beings are . . . not entitled to offer themselves, for profit, 
as things for use of others in the satisfaction of their sexual propensities. In so doing they would 
run the risk of having their person used by all and sundry as an instrument for the satisfaction 
of inclination’.). 
106 Shrage, Feminist Perspectives on Sex Markets, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (first 
published,  2004),  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminist-sex-markets/#Pro. For further 
discussion and critique, see Nussbaum, ‘Whether from Reason or Prejudice’: Taking Money for 
Bodily Services, 27 The Journal of Legal Studies 693, 695 (1998); Satz, Markets in Women’s Sexual 
Labor, 106 Ethics 63, 70 (1995); and Radin, Contested Commodities: The Trouble with the Trade in 
Sex, Children, Body Parts, and Other Things (Harvard U. Press, 2001).
107 See Shrage 2004. 
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realized only when each partner reciprocates the other’s gift in kind, offering her own 
sexuality in the same spirit in which she received the other’s -- as a genuine offering 
of the self. The commodification of sexual “services” destroys the kind of reciprocity 
required to realize human sexuality as a shared good, [and may corrupt non-market 
sexual relationships by promoting the valuation of women in terms of their market 
worth].108
Under this view, buying and selling sex are seen as wrongful because they undermine the 
value of sex and, ultimately, the value of the individual who engages in them. 
Although conceptually distinct, the two critiques are closely related. It is hard to imag-
ine any form of commodification that did not also involve objectification. And while one 
could certainly objectify without commodifying, commodification seems to involve a 
particularly strong form of objectification.
So what are the implications of these two critiques with respect to the ‘what consti-
tutes prostitution’ question? It would seem that a very wide range of sexual acts, whether 
or not paid for, could entail objectification. This would be true not only in the case of 
sexual penetration, but also with respect to non-penetrative and even non-contact sexual 
encounters, such as those that occurred in Keawe (lap dancing), Georgia (sadomasoch-
ism), Begley (stripper) and Turnpaugh (sex worker masturbating). And when such acts 
are being performed for money, the potential for social subordination, the undermining 
of reciprocity, and the corruption of non-market sexual relationships would seem to be 
all the greater. 
As for the ‘exchange’ element, the same concerns would arise even if sex was given in 
return for something of value other than money, such as a ride across town (Edwards), 
a fur coat (Johnson), or a decision by the justice of the peace to look the other way while 
criminal acts were being performed (Tunnel). Somewhat more difficult are those cases 
in which, in return for sex, a husband gives his wife an allowance, a corporate executive 
promises to support a subordinate in her bid for promotion, or a wealthy patron pays 
the college tuition of his younger, dependent lover. On the one hand, such acts do in-
volve penetrative sex for money. On the other hand, the opportunity for reciprocity and 
genuine offering of the self is arguably greater than in more conventional cases of ‘by the 
hour’ prostitution. If I am right, the argument for calling conduct of this sort prostitution 
would be weaker than in the typical case.
One can also imagine a plausible argument, made by the husband, the corporate ex-
ecutive, or the wealthy patron, that the money given to his wife, subordinate, or lover was 
being given not in return for sex, but rather as a mere incident to it. A similar claim has 
108 Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 154-155; see also 
Radin 2001, p. 133.
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been made in cases involving surrogate mother agreements, where the so-called ‘com-
modification of motherhood’ is a concern. Many jurisdictions have decided that, while 
it is impermissible to pay a surrogate mother directly for her services, she may be com-
pensated for her pregnancy-related expenses.109 Cases like Xiao (involving forty dollar 
drinks at a Honolulu nightclub) suggest that, despite its formalistic quality, an analogous 
argument could be successful in the context of prostitution.
●  Preventing Economic Exploitation and Oppression of Women (Liberal and 
Radical Versions)
Perhaps the most influential contemporary rationale for criminalising the purchase of 
sex (though not its sale) turns on the idea that prostitution involves the oppression and 
exploitation of sex workers (and, in some formulations, of women generally). There are 
essentially two different versions of the oppression critique, one associated primarily with 
liberal feminism, and the other with radical feminism. The liberal approach looks to the 
contingent particulars of how sex workers are treated in the real world, while allowing for 
the possibility that some prostitutes might not be subject to exploitative conditions. The 
radical approach, by contrast, views the purchase of sex as inherently exploitative and op-
pressive. Under this view, buying sex is always wrong and appropriate for criminalisation. 
Both approaches overlap to some degree with the more specific arguments regarding 
public health, violence, objectification, and commodification, considered above.
The liberal approach is exemplified by the views of early 20th century American re-
formers such as Jane Addams, who sought legislation to protect prostitutes at a time 
when the economy was becoming increasingly industrialized, and young, single women 
were moving to the cities and entering the workforce.110 Addams was a significant influ-
ence on the 1911 report of the Vice Commission of Chicago, which spoke of the ‘sad life 
of prostitution’, the ‘ghastly life story of fallen women’, and the ‘morally and physically 
debasing and degrading’ effects of the practice.111 Today, the liberal approach is exempli-
fied by scholars such as Peter de Marneffe, who has described sellers of sex as individuals 
caught up in an exploitative process ‘commonly experienced as humiliating and abusive, 
and result[ing] in lasting feelings of worthlessness, shame, and self-hatred’.112 
109 See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796-797 (Mass. 1998). 
110 See Langum, Crossing Over the Line: Legislating Morality and the Mann Act (University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 17-19. For a discussion of John Stuart Mill’s views of prostitution, see 
Clare McGlynn, John Stuart Mill on Prostitution: Radical Sentiments, Liberal Proscriptions, 
in Nineteenth-Century Gender Studies, issue 8.2 (summer 2012), http://www.ncgsjournal.com/
issue82/mcglynn.htm
111 1911 Chicago Report (quoted in de Marneffe, Liberalism and Prostitution, at p. 60).
112 de Marneffe 2010 p. 13.
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The radical approach is identified with late 20th century feminist scholars and 
advocates such as Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin. They view the prosti-
tution industry as a ‘quintessential expression of patriarchal gender relations and male 
domination’, a vehicle for inflicting coercion and exploitation on women.113 As Dworkin 
put it, ‘prostitution in and of itself is an abuse of a woman’s body. . . . When men use 
women in prostitution, they are expressing a pure hatred for the female body’.114 Unlike 
liberal feminists, who tend to focus on how prostitution and other sex work affects the 
rights of women individually, radical feminists tend to focus on the rights of women col-
lectively since, in their view, prostitution is the result of the subordination of the entire 
female gender.
According to the radical view, prostitution reflects deep structural inequalities be-
tween men and women, and perpetuates sexism, sex discrimination, and misogyny. So-
cial and economic inequalities between men and women render it nearly impossible for 
a woman to actually ‘choose’ to become a prostitute.115As Shulamit Almog explains, the 
very act of labeling an act of prostitution as ‘consensual’ is stigmatizing; the woman who 
consents in these circumstances is ‘marked, abandoned, [and] disgraced . . . separated by 
an abyss from all women who have not chosen to be prostitutes’.116 On this view, prostitu-
tion and other forms of putatively consensual sex work are viewed as on par with unam-
biguously non-consensual offenses such as domestic violence, sexual assault, and rape. 
And what are the implications of the liberal and radical views with respect to the 
‘what-counts-as-prostitution’ question? Both the liberal and the radical theorist are likely 
to see the potential for exploitation not only in conventional prostitution, but also in oth-
er forms of sex work, such as appearing in pornography and working in strip clubs.117 On 
this view, we would expect to see ‘prostitution’ defined quite broadly.
As for the ‘exchange’ aspects of prostitution, it seems likely that radical feminists (if not 
necessarily their liberal counterparts) would find cases involving marital, sugar   daddy, 
and office romance relationships sufficiently exploitative and oppressive to be included 
in the same basket as more conventional forms of prostitution. All of these relationships 
113 Weitzer, Legalizing Prostitution: From Illicit Vice to Lawful Business (NYU Press, 2012), at pp. 
10-11; see also Dworkin, Prostitution and Male Dominance, in Life and Death (New York: Free 
Press, 1997), at p. 139; MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Harvard 
U. Press, 1987), at p. 158; MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard U. Press, 
1989); Dempsey 2010, pp. 1736-1739; Aronson, Note, Seeking a Consolidated Feminist Voice for 
Prostitution in the U.S., 3 Rutgers Journal of Law & Urban Policy (2006), pp. 357, 370. 
114 Dworkin 1997, p.145.
115 Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 207. 
116 Almog, Prostitution as Exploitation: An Israeli Perspective, 11 Georgetown J. Gender and the 
Law (2011), p. 711.
117 Indeed, figures such as MacKinnon have been equally concerned with the exploitative effects of 
the pornography industry. MacKinnon 1987, p. 158. 
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seem to reflect the same kinds of patriarchal and unequal relationships that lie at the core 
of more traditional forms of prostitution. There would thus be no reason to exempt such 
cases from liability. 
7. Defining ‘Sex’ and ‘Sexual Conduct’ in Other Criminal Law Contexts 
In the previous several sections, we observed the difficulty of trying to say what consti-
tutes, or should constitute, ‘sex’ and ‘sexual conduct’ in the specific context of prostitu-
tion. In this concluding section, I suggest that analogous definitional quandaries arise 
in connection with a range of other sexual offenses as well, both consensual (such as 
adultery and adult incest), and nonconsensual (such as sexual assault). 
(a) ‘Sex’ in Ordinary Language
Before we consider how ‘sex’ is defined in these legal contexts, it will be useful to consid-
er briefly how the term is used in ordinary language. Those empirical studies that have 
been conducted have found that while almost all subjects agreed that penile-vaginal in-
tercourse qualifies as sex, there is a significant variance with respect to a range of other 
forms of conduct. Consider, for example, the results of a 2010 study from the Kinsey 
Institute. The survey asked a representative sample of subjects, ‘would you say you “had 
sex” with someone if the most intimate behavior you engaged in was . . . .?’ Ninety five 
percent of all participants answered yes with respect to penile-vaginal intercourse, but 
a smaller percentage answered yes with respect to penile-anal intercourse (81 percent), 
having oral contact with a partner’s genitals (71 percent), and touching or stimulating a 
partner’s genitals (45 percent).118 A similar study was published in 1999, not long after Bill 
Clinton implied, in grand jury testimony, that he had not ‘ha[d] sex’ with Monica Lew-
insky (who, it turns out, had fellated, but apparently not had intercourse with, him).119 
In the study, approximately six hundred American college students were asked the same 
‘would you say you “had sex”’ question. While there were some modest differences be-
tween the responses of men and women, a similar hierarchy emerged: More than 99 
percent said they would be ‘having sex’ if they had engaged in penile-vaginal intercourse; 
81 percent, penile-anal intercourse; 40 percent, oral contact with genitals; 15 percent, 
118 See Sanders et al., Misclassification Bias: Diversity in Conceptualisations About Having ‘Had 
Sex’, Kinsey Institute Research Paper (2010), http://kinsey.indiana.edu/publications/PDF/had%20
sex%20study.pdf
119 Reinisch and Sanders, Would You Say You ‘Had Sex’ If . . . ?, 281 Journal of the American Medical 
Association (1999), p. 275. Although the study was published after the Lewinsky scandal broke, 
the data were obtained prior.
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having a person touch the genitals; and less than 5 percent, oral or digital contact with 
breasts or nipples, or deep kissing.
Both of these studies probably raise at least as many questions as they answer.120 First, 
it is important to recognize that the subjects were asked about the meaning of ‘having 
sex’, rather than being engaged in ‘sexual conduct’. It is quite possible that some respon-
dents understood ‘having sex’ as a euphemism for sexual intercourse, presumably a sub-
set of the broader category of ‘sexual conduct’. The studies also don’t tell us much about 
context or demographics. In the case of the students, perhaps some were thinking about 
whether they could engage in such contact and still, for better or worse, consider them-
selves virgins. Perhaps they were concerned with issues of ‘fidelity’ to significant others. 
Perhaps their answers varied depending on their sexual orientation. In assessing their 
responses, it would be helpful to know what the subjects understood as the costs and 
benefits (to their mental health, self-esteem, reputation among their peers, and the like) 
of labelling some behaviour as ‘having sex.’ Would their answers have differed if they 
had been asked to make judgments about the conduct of others, rather than themselves? 
What if the person they were making a judgement about was their own regular sexual 
partner, who had been intimate with someone else? Would it matter if the conduct was 
performed in the context of a ‘hook-up’ or ‘one-night stand’, rather than in a long-term 
relationship? What assumptions did the subjects make based on the minimal description 
of the conduct given? Did the subjects assume that the contact was consensual? Would 
their answers have differed if they had been told that they had been forced or tricked or 
coerced into having such contact?
(b) Adultery
One of the reasons the ‘would you say you “had sex”’ question generated such interest 
in the wake of the Lewinsky scandal was that it played an obviously crucial role in de-
termining a moral and legal issue: only if Clinton had had sex with Lewinsky would he 
have committed adultery (at least with her). And Americans apparently still feel quite 
strongly about the wrongfulness of adultery (or at least the closely related act of ‘having 
an affair’). According to a recent Gallup poll, only 8 percent of American adults surveyed 
considered ‘married men and women having an affair’ to be ‘morally acceptable’, a low-
er percentage than considered it acceptable to clone humans (15%), engage in polyga-
my (16%), or commit suicide (19%), not to mention having a baby outside of marriage 
120 The discussion in this paragraph is borrowed from Green, What are the Sexual Offences?, in The 
New Philosophy of Criminal Law, eds. Flanders and Hoskins (Rowman Littlefield, 2015), pp. 57, 
62-63.
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(61%), engaging in homosexual relations (63%), or sex between an unmarried man and 
woman (68%).121 
The fact that people regard adultery as a moral wrong, however, does not necessarily 
mean they think it should be criminalised. Indeed, public opinion polls indicate that 
between two-thirds and three-quarters of those Americans surveyed believe that adultery 
should not be a crime for civilians.122 This may explain why, despite the fact it remains on 
the books in many U.S. jurisdictions, adultery is no longer prosecuted in civilian criminal 
courts123 (though it continues to play a significant role in (civil) divorce proceedings and 
to provide a basis for court-martial proceedings in the U.S. military124). 
Given its continued, if diminished, legal significance, it is worth asking how adul-
tery has been, and should be, defined. A few statutes make it a crime simply to commit 
‘adultery,’ without further explanation, in a manner reminiscent of statutes that make 
it a crime to engage in ‘prostitution’.125 Those provisions that do define the act, includ-
ing the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice, overwhelmingly require that a married 
person and someone who is not his spouse engage in the act of sexual ‘intercourse’ or 
121 Newport, Americans Continue to Shift Left on Key Moral Issues, Gallup.com (2015), http://
www.gallup.com/poll/183455/once-taboo-behaviors-acceptable.aspx. 
122 Rhode, Adultery: Infidelity and the Law (Harvard U. Press, 2016), at p. 22 (citing Associated Press 
and CNN/Gallup polls). 
123 See Posner and Silbaugh 1996 pp. 103-110 (listing statutes). Whether a civilian criminal 
prosecution for adultery could even survive U.S. constitutional challenge seems doubtful.  See 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (predicting that adultery 
laws, along with laws against fornication, bigamy, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity, could 
not survive majority’s opinion striking down Texas’ sodomy law). This is in contrast to other 
countries, especially in Asia, where adultery remains a crime. See, e.g., Xiaoying, Nearly 
90 Percent Oppose Abolishing Crime of Adultery, China Daily (June 15, 2015), http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-06/15/content_21008271.htm (poll data from Taiwan).  But see 
Delman, When Adultery is a Crime, The Atlantic (March 2, 2015) http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2015/03/south-korea-adultery-law-repeal/386603/ (noting that South 
Korean Constitutional Court recently struck down country’s adultery law).
124 Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 134, ¶ 62. Even in jurisdictions with no-fault divorce 
proceedings, evidence regarding adultery remains relevant with respect to property distributions, 
spousal support, and child custody. Pfeiffer, Virtual Adultery: No Physical Harm, no Foul?, 46 
University of Richmond L. Rev. (2012), pp. 667, 675. 
125 See e.g., W.V. Code s. 61-8-3.
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‘penetration’.126 Thus, in most states and in the military, ‘lesser’ forms of sexual contact 
would not constitute adultery.127 
So exactly how should adultery be defined, whether in law or morality? The answer, of 
course, depends on why we think adultery is wrong or socially harmful in the first place 
(assuming we do). In ‘traditional’ societies, the reasons adultery was viewed as wrong 
were similar to the reasons prostitution was traditionally viewed as wrong—namely, that 
it involved sex that occurred outside of what was religiously permissible, was likely to 
undermine family integrity, violated a husband’s property rights in his wife, and had the 
potential to raise questions about paternity.128 In practice, this meant that a wife’s adultery 
was generally treated more harshly than a husband’s. It also explains why adultery was 
defined so narrowly in law. As in the case of prostitution and common law rape, vaginal 
marital intercourse was the only kind of sex condoned by the law, so vaginal marital in-
tercourse with someone other than one’s spouse was the only kind of marriage transgres-
sion with which adultery law was properly concerned. A married partner who engaged 
in oral or anal sex in an extramarital relationship was engaging in conduct that was not 
permissible even within the marital bedroom; thus, the relationship could not be said to 
be harmed.129
In our age, of course, a far greater range of (consensual) sexual activity is viewed as 
morally ‘acceptable,’ or at least ‘tolerable’, both within marriage and among those who 
are not married. From this, one might infer that the definition of what constitutes adul-
tery should also be broader. For example, in a recent divorce case from Louisiana, the 
126 See sources cited in Posner and Silbaugh 1996 pp. 103-110. There is an interesting question 
about exactly which parties should be held liable for adultery. Imagine that A, who is married, 
has intercourse with B, who is not. The clear majority approach is to punish both A and B, though 
there are several states in which only the married person would be criminally liable. (The New 
Hampshire adultery statute applies to both parties so long as the unmarried party knows that 
his partner is married – see N.H. Rev. Stat. § 645:3.) One might think that the wrong entailed 
by adultery is committed in the first instance by the married party, not by the unmarried one. 
At most, B would be aiding and abetting A in a violation of A’s marriage vows. For this reason, 
if adultery is to remain a crime (and I doubt very much that it should), the minority approach, 
under which only married offenders are punished, may be preferable. 
127 Kentucky is unusual in having a statute that applies to ‘intercourse or sodomy,’ see Kentucky Rev. 
Stat. section 392.090(2), while North Carolina law requires that the adulterous couple ‘lewdly 
and lasciviously associate, bed, and cohabit together’, see N.C. Gen. Stat. section 14-184.
128 See generally Rhode 2016 pp. 24-59. As the case of R. v. Mawgridge, (1707) Kel. 199, 84 ER 1107 
at 1115, famously put it (in the context of the provocation defense), ‘[w]here a man is taken in 
adultery with another man’s wife, if the husband shall stab the adulterer or knock out his brains 
this is bare manslaughter: for jealousy is the rage of man and adultery is the highest invasion 
of property’. See also State v. Lash, 16 N.J.L. 380, 387 (N.J. Super Ct. 1838) (‘The heinousness of 
[adultery] consists in exposing an innocent husband to maintain another man’s children, and 
having them succeed to his inheritance.’).
129 For a helpful elaboration of this point, see generally Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 Virginia L. Rev. 
(1998), p. 1. 
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defendant admitted that she and a man who was not her husband had shared a bed and 
touched each other’s sexual organs, though she denied that they had had intercourse. In 
the absence of any statutory definition, the court determined that such non-coital contact 
was sufficient to constitute adultery.130 Some commentators, moreover, have even gone 
so far as to suggest that the concept of adultery should include cases of ‘virtual,’ online 
infidelities.131
Simply because our notion of what constitutes ‘acceptable’ sex is broader than it was 
at common law, however, does not necessarily mean that our notion of what constitutes 
adultery should also be broader. The reasons adultery is still so widely viewed as morally 
wrong today are clearly different than they were in traditional societies. To decide what 
should constitute adultery, we would need an adequate theory of why and how adultery is 
wrongful or harmful, and an understanding of what role the law and social stigma should 
play in its regulation. And the way we answer these questions may well vary depending 
on the precise context. For example, it appears that U.S. military law makes adultery an 
offense not because it is concerned with preserving the sanctity of marriage as such, but 
because adultery is said to be ‘prejudicial to good order and discipline’ and likely to bring 
‘discredit upon the armed forces’.132 By contrast, the reason ordinary civilians tell pollsters 
they regard adultery as wrongful may have more to do with moralized conceptions of 
loyalty, trust, and honesty within marriage. 
(c) Incest 
Analogous definitional questions arise in the context of incest law. Across U.S. jurisdic-
tions, statutes differ with respect to what constitutes both the prohibited sexual act and 
the prohibited relation. A majority of statutes say that it is a crime to ‘have intercourse 
with’ or ‘commit an act of sexual penetration’ with a relative (defined variously as an 
ancestor, descendant, parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, aunt, uncle, nephew, niece, 
sibling, or first cousin, by blood or adoption or marriage).133 A minority make it a crime 
simply to ‘perform a sex act’ with a relative on the prohibited list.134 
130 Bonura v. Bonura, 505 So.2d 143, 144 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
131 See Pfeiffer 2012; Cossman, The New Politics of Adultery, 15 Columbia Journal of Gender 
and Law (2006), pp. 274, 276-277; Hall, Sex Online: Is This Adultery?, 20 Hastings Comm. & 
Entertainment L.J. (1997), p. 201; Varnado, Avatars, Scarlet ‘A’s, and Adultery in the Technological 
Age, 55 Ariz. L. Rev. (2013), p. 371. 
132 Annuschat, Comment, An Affair to Remember: The State of the Crime of Adultery in the 
Military, 47 San Diego L. Rev. (2010), p. 1161.
133 Posner and Silbaugh 1996, pp. 129-142.
134 Ibid. Yet other statutes say that it is a crime to ‘marry’ a relative.
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So how should the ‘sex’ in incest be defined? Should it be limited to penetration, or 
should it apply to other ‘lesser’ sexual acts as well? Answering that question (as well as 
the question of what should constitute a prohibited familial ‘relation’) requires a consid-
eration of why and how incest is wrong and should be criminalized (assuming it should 
be) in the first place. 
These questions, of course, are contested, but three possible rationales can be men-
tioned: (1) preventing sexual abuse and sexual imposition, (2) protecting the family unit 
from intra-familial sexual jealousies and rivalries, and (3) reducing the risk that children 
will be born with genetic abnormalities.135 If incest laws were concerned exclusively with 
preventing genetic abnormalities, it would make sense to limit the offense to cases in-
volving fertile partners of the opposite sex having vaginal intercourse without adequate 
contraception. To the extent that incest laws are concerned with preventing intra-familial 
sexual jealousies, a broader definition of sexual activity would seem warranted, since 
non-penetrative sexual contacts between family members may be as likely to be induce 
destabilizing jealousies as those involving penetration. And to the extent that the purpose 
of incest law is to prevent sexual imposition and abuse—that is, insofar as incest is es-
sentially a non-consensual, rather than consensual, offence—an even broader definition 
would seem appropriate. The English Sexual Offences Act 2003 thus seems to take the 
right approach when it distinguishes, at the outset, between incest involving adults and 
incest involving juveniles. If the former, there must be ‘penetration’; if the latter, any sex-
ual ‘touching’ will suffice. 136
 (d) Nonconsensual Offenses 
So far in this article, we have considered the definition of ‘sexual conduct’ as it appears 
in three distinct offences: prostitution, adultery, and incest. The first thing to note about 
adultery and adult incest (I leave to the side incest involving children) is that they are 
putatively consensual offenses. If there is any reason to criminalise them, it is not because 
anyone’s sexual autonomy is being violated. Rather, it’s because of some societal interest 
that is extraneous to consent and autonomy—presumably, the sanctity of marriage (in the 
case of adultery) or the integrity of the family (in the case of adult incest). 
Because the underlying conduct is consensual, we would expect to see the offense 
defined fairly narrowly. Otherwise, there is a danger that the law might be applied in an 
overbroad manner, unduly infringing the right to sexual autonomy. For example, consen-
135 See generally Hörnle, Consensual Adult Incest: A Sex Offense?, 17 New Criminal Law Review 76 
(2014); Bergelson, Vice is Nice But Incest is Best: The Problem of a Moral Taboo, 7 Criminal Law 
and Philosophy (2013), p. 43.
136 Sexual Offences Act 2003, ss. 64(1), 25(1), respectively.
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sually embracing or kissing a sibling or child or parent, or even observing them naked, 
might be treated as incestuous; and doing so with a friend or acquaintance who was not 
one’s spouse could be treated as adulterous. By requiring that the consensual act being 
performed be penetrative, we minimize the possibility that the law will be applied too 
broadly. 
When we turn to the nonconsensual offenses, however, we see a very different moral 
and legal landscape. Virtually every means of sexually imposing on V without her con-
sent (or, in some cases, without her assumption of risk) is wrong and potentially criminal 
—whether it is extremely intimate means such as having penetrative sex (as in rape), or 
less intimate means such as touching (as in sexual assault), watching her while she is nude 
(as in voyeurism), or subjecting her to unwanted sexual sights (as in indecent exposure). 
Here, we need not appeal to some interest that is extraneous to consent or autonomy, as 
we do in the case of adultery or adult incest. Here, it is precisely the lack of consent that 
makes the act wrong. The challenge of criminalising the nonconsensual offenses thus lies 
less in the danger of overcriminalising than it does in the need for grading. Although vir-
tually all acts of nonconsensual sex will be wrong, they will not all deserve equal punish-
ment; we will need a means of distinguishing the more serious acts from the less serious 
ones. 
We do this, in the case of the nonconsensual offenses, by creating a range of sepa-
rate offenses with separate punishments. Taking the English Sexual Offences Act 2003 
as a model, we can see that Sections 2 and 3 involve nonconsensual penetration, Section 
4 involves other kinds of nonconsensual touching, Section 66 involves nonconsensual 
exposure, Section 67 involves nonconsensual watching, and so forth. With the exception 
of sexual assault,137 which serves as a kind of safety-net provision, we need not be con-
cerned with general ‘what counts as sexual conduct’ issues. 
And what of prostitution? Would we expect its ‘sexual activity’ element to be defined 
narrowly, in a manner that is reminiscent of adultery and adult incest, or would we expect 
it to follow the broad approach to defining sex we have seen in the context of the non-
consensual offenses taken as a whole? That, in a sense, is the central puzzle we have been 
grappling with in this article. Those who view the selling of sex as an essentially  consen-
sual act will want to criminalise it—assuming they do—exclusively out of concern with 
matters that are extraneous to consent and autonomy, such as promoting public health 
and preventing violence. Their definition of what counts as ‘sex’ is likely to be a narrow 
one. By contrast, those who believe that prostitution is inherently coercive and exploit-
ative, and therefore essentially nonconsensual, will tend to view almost every commercial 
137 Under Section 3, sexual assault is defined to include non-consensual touchings of any part of 
the victim’s body with any part of the offender’s body or with anything else, provided that the 
‘the touching is sexual’. A touching would, in turn, be considered ‘sexual’ ‘if a reasonable person 
would consider that it was of a sexual ‘nature’ or that its ‘circumstances’ or ‘purpose’ were sexual.
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sex transaction, both penetrative and non-penetrative, with suspicion. Their tendency 
will be to define the sex in prostitution more broadly.
Efforts to define the second element in prostitution—that of ‘exchange’—will follow 
a similar path. Here we must decide whether to treat cases involving marital sex, ‘office 
romances’, ‘sugar daddy’ arrangements, and therapeutic treatment as prostitution. Also 
relevant here are cases involving the exchange of sex for non-propertised goods, such as 
official acts. Whether we ultimately decide to treat such cases as prostitution will depend, 
as before, on why we think prostitution is wrong or should be a crime in the first place. 
Those who are concerned primarily with preventing disease and violence will tend, once 
again, to prefer a narrow definition of exchange. Those who focus mainly on preventing 
objectification, commodification, exploitation, and oppression will likely favour a broad-
er approach.
